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of another court with similar
powers, for the evident purpose of
evading the Constitution, would be
unconstitutional.
But whether the criticism of the
principle which allows territorial
judges to be appointed for specific
terms be sound or not, one thing
is certain, that the reasons which
have led the Supreme Court to con-
sider that Section x of Article III
of the Constitution did not apply
to courts of the territories, has
no application to a Commission
Court, which would conclusively
interpret the law of the lawful rail-
way rates between towns in differ-
ent States, i. e., the rates s hich
Congress established when they
said all rates shall be "just and
reasonable." These laws are passed
by Congress in pursuance of its
right to "regulate commerce with
foreign nations, between the States,
and with the Indian tribes." It is a
power which Congress exercises in
its r6le of a legislative body for a
Federal government. The interpre-
tation of such laws is a judicial
function conferred on the Federal
government by the express words
of Article III, and in providing
for its exercise, Congress is ex-
pressly limited by the same article
to appointing judges "during good
behavior."
W. D. L.
NOTE.
In sequence with the foregoing Annotation, the April
number of the AMERICAN LAW REGISTER AND REVIEW
will contain an examination of some constitutional questions
raised by the proposed annexation of the Hawaian Islands.
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THE KNIGHTS TEMPLAR AND MASONS' LIFE INDEMNITY
COMPANY v. BERRY ET AL.1
Insurance by Beneficial Association.
An association claiming to be a beneficial association defended a suit -
on a death certificate on the ground that the person to whom the certifi-
cate was issued had committed suicide, which was a sufficient defense,
unless the association was in effect an insurance company, in which case,
under the laws of the State where the question arose, such a defense
could not be effecthally interposed. Hel, that the holder 9f the certifi-
cate could recover.
I RepQrted in 5o Fed. Rep., 5I,
INSURANCE BY BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATIONS.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
In Error from the Ciruit Court for the Western Dis-
triel of Afissouri to the Circuit Court of Afzfeals of the Eighth
Circuit.
The action was brought to recover on a policy issued
by the Knights Templar and Masons' Life Indemnity Com-
pany to a man who afterward committed suicide. The
policy provided that no recovery should be had in case of
self-destruction by the insured, except to the amount of
assessments paid in. The insurance laws of Missouri, how-
ever, provided that suicide should not constitute a defense
to an action on a policy. The Court held that while the
company was expressed to be a benevolent association, yet
its contract was one of insurance, and it was, therefore,
brought within the insurance laws. Affirmed.
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There are two points involved in
the principal case, viz.:
(i) That the organization whose
charter and by-laws were before the
Court was in effect an insurance
company, although masquerading
under the cloak of a beneficial as-
sociation; and
(2) That it was proper to show
this fact in a suit on the certificate
or policy.
The main question in this case is
of essential importance in a large
number of cases in which so-called
beneficial associations are involved,
because of the different rules which
govern the transfers of the policy
of life insurance and the certificate
of death benefits, and the defenses
to each, and because of the penal-
ties generally provided for violation
of insurance laws. In the former
the contract is of such a character
that the beneficiary has a vested in-
terest in the policy which he alone
may divest; in the latter the bene-
ficiary has in most cases merely an
expectancy, which the member of
the association alone, or the mem-
ber with the concurrence of the as-
sociation, may divest. Moreover,
the laws governing life insurance
are extremely stringent in many
States (e. g., in limiting the de-
fenses to policies, in the deposit of
bonds for a reserve, etc.), and if an
insurance company is likely to at-
tempt to avoid the penalties of the
statute, by assuming the guise of a
beneficial association, it becomes of
great practical importance to form-
ulate such rules that it may be
possible to determine what are the
essential features of each sort of
organization.
It is clearly settled that the simple
assumption of the form of a bene-
ficial association is not sufficient to
enable the company to avoid the
effect of the insurance laws. This
is shown by the principal case as
well as by others: Com. v. Wether-
bee, 1o5 Mass., 149.
Of course, each organization
stands on its own bottom. If it is
an insurance company in effect, if
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its chief purpose is to pay a mem-
ber's estate, or assignee, or desig-
nated beneficiary, a stipulated sum
on the decease of the member, then
it is an insurance company, no
matter what its form. If its chief
purpose is one of befiefit, whatever
that term may imply, it is a bene-
ficial association. It is of vital im-
portance to learn the facts of each
case. The importance of these and
the impossibility of reaching any
satisfactory conclusion without
them is shown by Com. ex rel.
Atty.-Gen. v. Equitable Beneficial
Association, 137 Pa., 412, where
CLAKK, 3., dwelt at some length on
the difference in theory and purpose
between the two sorts of organiza-
tion, but whose opinion is not de-
cisive in the present connection
because the facts of that case were
dissimilar. To say, broadly, that
there are two sorts of companies,
the one to insure, the other to
benefit, does not aid materially in
the solution of the problem.
While the.decisions are not inhar-
monious in broad statement of
principles, it is not at all easy to
decide just what are the essential
features of a beneficial associa-
tion.
The features which suggest them-
selves as bearing on the question
are the existence of capital stock,
the government of the company,
the accumulation of assets with
which to pay policies, a reserve
fund, whether the assessments are
made before or afterthe death of the
member, whether the death benefit
is a stipulated sum or variable with
the size of membership, entrance
fees, limitation of death benefits to
certain classes of persons, whether
the purpose is wholly financial en-
dowments, sick benefits, etc. That
mo one of these is decisive of the
question may be seen by a brief
review of some of the leading
cases.
In the opinion of the Court in
Berry v. Indemnity Co., affirmed in
the principal case, it is said: "There
are corporations in which the ele-
ment of insurance is so mingled
with benevolent, charitable, social,
or other ends that it is difficult to
tell whether they should be classed
as insurance companies or benevo-
lent societies. But that difficulty
does not arise in this case. It is
apparent from an examination of
its charter and its method of doing
business that the defendant is a
mutual life insurance company on
the assessment plan. Its business
is insurance and nothing else.
There is not a social, charitable or
benevolent feature in its organiza-
tion, or the conduct of its business.
It has no lodges, pays no sick dues,
and distributes no aid, and gives no
attention to members in distress or
poverty. It deals with its members
on the strictest business principles.
The learned counsel for
defendant say that their client
manifests its "benevolence by con-
tract and through contractual rela-
tions instead of mere voluntary and,
therefore, uncertaingifts." That is
precisely the kind of benevolence
practiced by all insurance compa-
nies as long as they continue to pay
their honest losses. The defendant
is not a "co-operative benevolent
insurance society," nor a fraternal
brotherhood having a community
interest (whatever these phrases
may mean), but is an incorporated
life insurance company on the co-
operative or assessment plan, not
for mutual benevolence, but for
mutual insurance.
In Com. v. Wetherbee, io5 Mass.,
149, which may be regarded as a
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leading case on the subject, and in
which The Connecticut Mutual
Benefit Company was before the
Court, GRAY, J., said: "A contract
of insurance is an agreement by
which one party for a consideration
(which is usually paid in money,
either in one sum, or at different
times, during the continuance of
risk) promises to make a certain
payment of money upon the de-
struction or injury of something in
which the other party has an inter-
est. in fire and marine insurance
the thing insured is property; in
life or accident insurance it is the
life or health of a person. In either
case neither the times and amounts
of payments by the assured, nor the
modes of estimating or securing the
payment of the sum to be paid by
the insurer, affect the question
whether the agreement between
them is a contract of insurance."
The contract in this case called for
payment of $io at its inception, $2
annually, and $r upon the death of
any member. The corporation had
also established a guaranty fund of
$roo,ooo. "This is not the less a
contract of mutual insurance upon
the life of the assured, because the
amount to be paid by the corpora-
tion is not a gross sum, but a sum
graduated by the number of mem-
bers holding similar contracts; nor
because a portion of the premium is
to bepaidupon the uncertain periods
of the deaths of such members; nor
because in case of non-payment of
assessments by any member the
contract provides no means of en-
forcing payment thereof, but
merely declares the contract at an
end, and all moneys previousl3F paid
by the assured, and all dividends
and credits accrued to him to be
forfeited to the company."
In Boltou v. Bolton, 73 Me., 299,
the by-laws of the association pro-
vided that each member should pay
a membership fee of $2, and $i.io
on each assessment, in considera-
tion of which the association agreed
to pay to the member's widow as
many dollars, not exceeding $i,ooo,
as there should be surviving mem-
bers. The membership was limited
to Masons. The contract was, never-
theless, held to be a contract of
insurance, notwithstanding that the
organization was benevolent and
not speculative.
In State v. Brewer, 15 'Io. App.,
597, the provisions were to promote
the well-being of the members, and
to furnish aid to their families in
case of their death. No moral or
social pre-requisite was required for
membership, but merely certain
conditions of age and health.
There were 11o benefits except in
case of death, and funds were col-
lected for this purpose by assess-
ments. Held to be a mutual in-
surance company and subject to
the insurance laws of the State.
See also State v'. Citizens' Beneficial
Association, 6 Mo. App., 163, and
State v. Merchants' Exchange
Beneficial Association, 72 Mo., 146.
In American Legion of Honor v.
Larmour, 8 Tex., 71, the certificate
of the American Legion of Honor
was held to be an insurance con-
tract, but under a special statute
the company was held exempt from
certain penalties provided forregu-
lar insurance companies. A similar
corporation, whose purpose was
declared to be "to give financial
aid and benefits to members during
life, and to their families or those
depending on th em after death, and
to pay weekly sick benefits to its
members," etc., was held to be an
insurance company in Farmer r'.
the State, 69 Texas, 561.
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In Rochhold v. Canton Masonic
Benevolent Society, 129 Ill., 44o, a
contract of membership, issued by
a benevolent society, whereby the
society agreed in view of the age
and condition of health of the
member, and in consideration of a
present payment and of the agree-
ment to pay to it certain con-
tingent sums in the future, to pay
him or to his widow or heirs, etc.,
was held, apart from all statutory
definitions and classifications, a
contract of life insurance. The
,statutory provision of Illinois per-
mitting certain associations, whose
death benefits should be for the
widows of members, and where
there were no annual dues or
premiums, and no member was to
receive any profit, is complied with,
although a member of such an or-
ganization receives pay as an officer;
and such an association does not
have to deposit bonds: The Com-
mercial'League Assoc. of America
v. The People, 90 Ill., 1878.
In State v. Farmers' Benevolent
Association, 18 Neb., 276, the con-
tract was held to be one of insur-
ance, although sick benefits were
to be paid.
In State v. Standard Life Associ-
ation, 38 Ohio, 281, an association,
organized under the statute allow-
ing mutual benefit associations, did
not purport to afford any relief and
protection to its members, but only
to provide for their family and
heirs. It was held to be in no
sense a mutual aid association to
members, but a mutual insurance
of members for the benefit of their
family and heirs.
In "Mutual Benefit Life Insurance
Company v. Mary6, 85 Va., 643, it
was held that a company doing
business on the assessment, plan
must pay its benefits by assess-
ments made after the death of a
member upon the surviving mem-
bers.
In State v. Nichols, 78 Iowa, 747,
the Ancient Order of United Work-
men was before the Court. Its
purpose was declared to be (i) to
give protection to all kinds of
labor; (2) to create a fund for the
benefit of its members during sick-
ness or other disability, and in case
of death to pay a stipulated sum to
such person or persons as may be
designated by each member, thus
enabling him to guarantee his
family against want; (3) certain
secret work; (4) literary and scien-
tific work. There was no provision
for carrying out the ist, 3d and 4th.
It was held that such an organiza-
tion was a mutual insurance com-
pany, and subject to the insurance
laws.
It State v. Crickett, et al., 37
Minn., 13, the purpose of the asso-
ciation was to endow the wife of
each member when he should have
married with a sum equal to as
many dollars as there were mem-
bers, to be collected by assess-
ment. There was an admission fee
of $iO, half yearly dues of $2, and
each assessment was to be $1.25.
There was no capital stock. Held
not to be a beneficial association.
From an examination of the fore-
going cases, it will be seen that, in
the absence of statutory provisions,
organizations whose prominent ob-
ject isto insure against death or ac-
cident have been declared insur-
ance companies, despite the fact of
that object being coupled with a pur-
pose of greater or less benevolence.
Some of the Courts have held that
the existence of the purpose to in-
sure is sufficient to stamp upon
the company its character, no
matter what other features may
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be present. That would seem to
be the most satisfactory position
to assume, inasmuch as any quali-
fication of it might lead, as it has
led, to fraud on the part of com-
panies organized for the purpose of
securing the benefits of life insur-
ance without being subjected to the
rigid laws which govern it in most
States.
The mere fact of the prospectus
or the constitution of the company
containing an expression of benev-
olent design, would not seem to
change the situation, for bene-
ficence to the parties interested is
the spirit of all mutual insur-
ance companies. Beneficial asso-
ciations, so far as the payment of
death benefits are concerned, are
not more benevolent either in de-
sign or execution. Each sort of
organization is beneficial to a lim-
ited class, namely, its members. It
would seem to be logically neces-
sary, therefore, that beneficial as-
sociations should have some addi-
tional or different characteristics to
warrant the courts in holding that
they are not insurance companies.
Where there are statutory pro-
visions, of course such provisions
govern: Com. v. National Mutual
Aid Association, 94 Pa. St., 481;
State v. Bankers' and Merchants'
Mut. Benefit Assoc., 23 Kan., 499;
State v. Merchants' Exchange Mut.
Benefit Society, 22 Alb. L. J., 427.
But in such cases the question has
usually arisen in an action by the
commonwealth to inflict a penalty.
Whether the same decision would
hold in cases where the company
was not a party may be questioned.
LEwis LAWREliCE SMITH.
